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TAKING THE TOOL ANALOGY SERIOUSLY: 
FORMS AND NAMING IN THE CRATYLUS 
Abstract 
It has been suggested that the so-called tool analogy passage of 
Plato’s Cratylus presents us with a moderate linguistic naturalism 
that can stand or fall independently of the more unpalatable 
etymological and mimetic theories advanced later in the dialogue. 
This paper offers a reading of the tool analogy which argues that 
Socrates’ employment of Forms (and in particular Species-
Forms), together with a careful distinction between the types of 
knowledge associated with making and using tools, aims to 
establish a radical linguistic naturalism that constrains the 
intrinsic properties of names. This should be clear if we take 
Socrates’ claim seriously that names are tools: tools in general can 
only function successfully if they exhibit the relevant structural, 
compositional and (to some extent) material properties. Since 
Socrates claims that names are a class of tools and not merely like 
tools in some respects, as many have supposed, then what holds 
for tools in general must also hold for names.  1
Introduction 
The Cratylus begins with a disagreement about names.  Cratylus believes that 2
names have to be naturally correct for their objects if they are to be those objects’ 
names, while Hermogenes, on the other hand, believes that we may call objects 
 I would like to thank Prof. M.M. McCabe, Prof. Malcolm Schofield, Dr. James Doyle and the anonymous 1
referees at CCJ  for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
 It has often been noted that the Greek word ὄνοµα has broader signification than the English “name”; my use of 2
the English “name” in this essay should be understood broadly to encompass all referring terms, and, furthermore, 
“referring term” should be understood to encompass both names of objects and predicate terms. (For further 
discussion of this point see, e.g., Ackrill (1994); 36 Fine (1978) 291ff). 
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anything we like: no one name is more correct for an object than another. Socrates is 
enrolled in the discussion to help them find out which one of them is right. Most of 
the ensuing discussion finds Socrates appearing to take the side of Cratylus by 
expounding a theory that attempts to show why a name has to be naturally correct for 
the object that it names, and that offers an explanation of what such natural 
correctness amounts to.   
Hermogenes’ own view is deeply grounded in his belief that names are 
arbitrary.  He claims, against Cratylus, that a name is simply “a piece of voice” (τῆς ...  
φωνῆς µόόριον) which is uttered (ἐπιφθεγγόόµενοι) (383a7).  To say that names are 3
arbitrary is to say that their intrinsic properties could have been otherwise without 
detriment to existing reference relations. Moreover, Hermogenes holds not merely 
that a name could have been different but that, it can in fact be different: if one sets 
down a new name for something, that new name is “no less correct” than the original, 
“just as when we change the names of our slaves”.  In contrast, Cratylus denies that 4
names are arbitrary: he denies that “Hermogenes” is Hermogenes’ name, we may 
suppose, because “Hermogenes” can be analysed to yield a particular description, 
“offspring of Hermes”, which is not true of Cratylus’ interlocutor.  
For the purposes of this paper I will characterise the salient negative feature of 
Hermogenes’ position I wish to start from as follows: 
• If linguistic naturalism were true then names would be non-
arbitrary. Since, names are arbitrary, linguistic naturalism is 
false.  
 The root verb φθέέγγοµαι need not denote meaningful speech but rather a sound or a noise that could be produced 3
by an animal or even an inanimate object. (LSJ, s.v. I 2,3; cf. Ademollo (2011) 25)
 Crat. 384e.4
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 If names are arbitrary, some mechanism is required by means of which 
members of a linguistic community can coordinate the use of these arbitrary sounds 
so as to enable successful communication. Convention, or intra-community 
agreements to use certain sounds in certain ways, seems to be the most promising 
candidate to fill the gap.  However, many have considered Hermogenes’ brand of 5
conventionalism, which allows for conventions to be made by individuals alone, 
untenable. Accordingly, some have suggested that Hermogenes stands refuted within 
just a few pages, since his conventionalism about names is shown to entail a 
relativism about things that he is not prepared to commit to.   Recent work, however, 6
has demonstrated that Hermogenes’ conventionalism is a more substantial thesis than 
had been previously thought, does not entail a general relativism, and that, instead of 
attempting to refute Hermogenes by proving as much, Socrates rather argues that 
linguistic naturalism follows from certain objectivist premises he agrees to.  7
However, if Socrates wants to disabuse Hermogenes of the belief that 
linguistic naturalism is false, then he must either (a) demonstrate to Hermogenes the 
falsehood of his belief that names are arbitrary, or (b) advance a linguistic naturalism 
 Laurence (1996, 273) describes our pre-theoretic notions of conventionalism as follows: (1) Linguistic properties 5
are not intrinsic properties of the utterances which have them. The marks and sounds we use could have (or could 
have had) linguistic properties other than those they in fact have; (2) Though we might speak of any of a large 
number of possible languages, the members of a given linguistic community have a common interest in linguistic 
coordination (i.e., in speaking the same language), because they have a common interest in communication. The 
traditional source for modern views on conventionalism is, of course, Lewis’ seminal discussion in Convention 
(1969); however, it would seem that Lewis would not have a problem with a Crusoe language whereby an 
individual could establish his own naming conventions (182). 
 For examples of those who see Hermogenes presented as an extreme, or naive conventionalist, or swiftly refuted, 6
see e.g., Baxter (1992) 18, Fine (1977) 295, Gold (1978) 242ff., Kahn (1973) 158-9, Ketchum (1979) 136, Reeve 
(1998), xiv. However, Hermogenes may get some sympathy from Davidson (1984, 265; 1992, 114), who has 
denied that the arbitrariness of linguistic expressions entails that their meanings are necessarily fixed by 
conventions. While accepting that linguistic coordination, in the sense of adhering to a common set of conventions, 
facilitates successful communication, he denies linguistic coordination is necessary for it. It may be the case that 
Hermogenes, like Davidson denies that conventions – understood as interpersonal agreements – are necessary for 
successfully picking out and communicating states of affairs in the world to another, while accepting that 
interpersonal agreements nevertheless facilitate communication (he makes no attempt to diverge from common 
Greek linguistic practice in the dialogue (cf. Barney (1997) 154).
 Cf. Ademollo (2011) 81, Sedley (2003) 54.7
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that holds even if names are arbitrary (and thus show that linguistic naturalism does 
not entail that names are non-arbitrary). Of course, (b) does not amount to a proof of 
linguistic naturalism, it merely defeats Hermogenes’ particular objection to it. 
Nevertheless, in context, this should leave Hermogenes more amenable to an 
alternative, naturalist thesis. 
Socrates’ positive naturalist thesis comes in two parts. The discussion of 
386d–390e, known as the “tool analogy”, comprises a largely deductive argument 
making appeal to the Forms and proceeds from a rejection of a traditional Platonic 
concern, Protagorean relativism.  Socrates then advances (391b–427d) an 8
etymological-mimetic theory of naming that appeals to the evidence of the phonetic 
and structural properties of actual Greek names in an attempt to show Hermogenes 
that names are non-arbitrary since their internal constitutions render them “correct 
for” the objects they name.  
Some commentators have supposed that the tool analogy and the 
etymological-mimetic theory of names are susceptible of independent evaluation: they 
need not stand or fall together.  The tool analogy, on these interpretations, typically 9
provides a general, functionalist account of names aimed at demonstrating the truth of 
linguistic naturalism (in some form or other) to Hermogenes; the etymological-
mimetic account (which clearly pursues strategy (a)), provides one, but not the only 
possible, articulation of that theory’s details. Thus if the details advanced by the 
 See, e.g., Akrill (1994), Gold (1978), Ketchum (1979), Kahn (1973), White (1978), and (to some extent) Barney 8
(2001) e.g., 47. I maintain that this argument is largely deductive, contrary to, e.g., Ketchum (1979) 138, who 
suggests the argument is analogical. The reasons for this will become apparent during the course of the discussion.
 Ketchum (1979, 143) suggests that the tool analogy is primarily aimed at refuting conventionalism, while the 9
remainder of the discussion of naturalism promotes a “theory of meaning”, which can stand or fall alone. See also, 
e.g., Akrill (1994) 43-51, Barney (2001) 47, Gold (1978) 245-6, Kahn (1973) 173, Silverman (1992) 44, and White 
(1978) n.12.
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etymological-mimetic theory are rejected, the general framework of the functionalist 
account may be left unscathed. Moreover, this leaves open the possibility of reading 
the tool analogy as providing a different argument in favour of naturalism: one which 
pursues strategy (b), by advocating a moderate linguistic naturalism which constrains 
certain naming practices while at the same time allowing for arbitrary names. 
One typical such reading envisages a moderate linguistic naturalism that 
requires merely that a name must (if it is to be a name) separate out a natural kind. On 
such a theory, as Fine suggests, “[i]f, for example, our language contains the word 
‘trock’, to be applied indifferently to trees and rocks, yet trees and rocks are distinct 
natural kinds, ‘trock’ is an incorrect name; it does not divide up reality correctly.”  10
Irwin supposes that it is a conventionalism that allows this sort of error that Socrates 
seeks to reject.  Thus so long as distinctions between names map genuine distinctions 11
in nature, the intrinsic properties of an individual name could, we may suppose, be 
arbitrary. On this line of interpretation the conclusions of the tool analogy, which 
allow for arbitrary names, can survive the rejection of the etymological-mimetic 
thesis.  12
 Fine (1978) 296. See also Kretzmann (1971) 131-2.10
 The evidence for this view is sought by Irwin (1999) and Kretzmann (1971) at 394d, where Socrates claims that 11
it is fitting to give the offspring of a lion the name of a lion. There is no doubt that the interpretation of the tool 
analogy presented here would support this claim, but it is not the only consequence of it; rather this follows a 
fortiori from the stronger conclusions I suggest.
 Prima Facie, it is unclear on this view, however, which of Hermogenes’ original claims are being attacked. 12
Hermogenes suggests there is no reason why a particular object (or kind) should be called one name rather than 
another; nowhere does he claim that it is legitimate for one natural kind to share a name with a different natural 
kind. Hermogenes’ agreement, at 385a, that one may call one and the same thing “horse” in private and “man” in 
public should not be taken to imply that two distinct kinds can share a name in the relevant sense: he never claims 
that the same name could be used of both man and horse in the same context of use, be that public or private. 
Furthermore, the mention of Greek and barbarian languages at 390a can but call to mind Pol. 262dff, where the 
Stranger notes that dividing human beings into classes with the names “Greeks” and “barbarians” is a mistake 
since it fails to cleave nature at the joints. Pace Irwin (1999) 148, “barbarian”, in the Statesman at least, 
nevertheless appears to succeed in picking out its mongrel class when so used.
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 This paper provides considerations against reading the tool analogy in this 
way: properly understood, the tool analogy argument is intended to show that names 
are non-arbitrary. Key to this interpretation are both Socrates’ introduction of Species-
Forms (389b8), which finely circumscribe the features of the specific tools that 
instantiate them, and his careful distinction between the crafts of the expert name-
maker, the νοµοθέέτης (or ὀνοµατουργόός ), and the expert name-user, the dialectician. 
Traditionally, little has been made of this distinction by the defenders of moderate 
naturalism.  Moreover, Ademollo, in his recent commentary on the Cratylus, has 13
dismissed the distinction as unreal; yet, as I will suggest, taking the distinction 
seriously is required to give substance to his (to my mind, correct) suspicion that the 
notion of Species-Forms “may be, as a matter of fact, much more tightly connected 
with the purpose of naturalism than is usually supposed”.  14
 The specialised ability afforded to the name-maker in looking to the Species-
Form of each name and setting it in sounds and syllables is at the core of the 
conclusion of the Tool Analogy (390d7-e5), where Socrates does not claim to have 
shown (merely) that Hermogenes’ conventionalism is wrong, but that “Cratylus is 
speaks the truth (ἀληθῆ λέγει) when he says that names exist by nature for 
things” (390d11-e1). It will be to the detriment of any interpretation, then, not to give 
the craft of name-making its due. 
 Silverman (1992, 39) suggests that the former is “rather simply each of us in our capacity as a dialectitian.” 13
Robinson (1969, 105) claims that the νοµοθέέτης “is there as a mythical device to make it easier to develop an 
abstract theory”. Keller (2000) makes no mention of the distinction between νοµοθέέτης and dialectician, save to say 
that a name (unlike other tools) lacks the specificity to require an expertise of making – it is rather like a 
paperweight (292-3), yet it follows from the claim that name-making is an expertise that names, on this account, 
have just that specificity. 
 Ademollo (2011)138-144.14
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In section 1, I suggest that the Socrates’ discussion of successful actions at the 
opening of the tool analogy constitutes no objection, by itself, to Hermogenes’ 
original claim that we can call objects by any name that we like. The agreement 
elicited that naming, as all actions, is subject to objective success criteria does not 
entail that those criteria themselves could not be determined by conventions or 
something similar. This early passage at most demonstrates that a name’s use must be 
in accordance with what it was established for.  
In section 2, I suggest that Socrates’ subsequent introduction of a “Species-
Form”, which a name must possess in order to be a name for a particular object, sets 
natural constraints on naming-conventions themselves. The Species-Form accounts 
for a particular name’s necessarily having the particular function that it does (say, the 
function of naming a cat rather than a dog) and strictly constrains how it may 
subsequently be used. However, I suggest, we must take more than mere functions 
into account if we are to make sense of the claim that the name-maker’s unique skills 
afford his names authority alone. 
Thus, in section 3, I go on to suggest that the Species-Form, understood in the 
context of the tool-maker’s craft, must not only constrain a name’s function, but must 
also constrain its structural features: what it must be like in order to function as a 
name for its nominatum. If a tool’s user knows how to use a tool (and so primarily has 
knowledge of its function) and the maker’s knowledge is distinct from this, then there 
are grounds to suppose that the maker’s knowledge includes, inter alia, knowledge of 
facts about what a tool must be like in order to perform its function. Moreover, the 
requirement for collaboration between maker and user in tool production cannot be 
easily made sense of unless Socrates intends us to view Species-Forms as determining 
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the structural properties of names.  I then suggest that by examining certain claims in 
the opening passages of the etymological discussion (391c10-395a2), we may best 
understand the name-maker’s task of embodying the Form in the matter as his 
encoding informational content in sounds and syllables, in virtue of which a name so 
created can perform its intended task. Apparent minor differences in the informational 
content of names that Socrates claims to be “the same” can thus be explained in terms 
of the approximation of particulars to the Forms that they instantiate.  
In the concluding section, I make some tentative suggestions as to the 
implications of this reading of the tool analogy for our understanding of the Cratylus 
as a whole. 
1. The “Tool Analogy”  
I attach the traditional label of “tool analogy” to the first part of Socrates’ 
naturalist thesis, but here I introduce a caveat:  the tool analogy passage is not an 
argument by analogy. It is important to recognise that Socrates does not claim that 
names work analogously to tools; he claims that they are tools. Consequently, we 
cannot interpret the relevant passages as if Plato thought of names as sui generis 
entities that merely happen to share certain properties with tools, so that a discussion 
of tools may shed light on some aspects of names – as if, when it serves to make Plato 
look more hospitable to modern semantic doctrines, we may ignore the constraints 
imposed by the general claims made about tools in the passage.  We risk 15
misinterpreting Plato here unless we acknowledge that the so-called tool analogy 
classifies names as tools, and not merely as like tools in some respects.  
 See, e.g., Evans (2011) 341-2.15
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In the first stage of the tool analogy (386d8-389a4) Socrates makes some 
remarks about tools, and names as a class of tools, which together imply certain facts 
about naming. These can be set out as follows: 
1. All objects exist independently of us; they have their own independent, 
stable natures. (386d8-e4) 
2. Actions, as a class of objects, also have their own independent natures. 
(386e6-8) 
3. In order for an action to be successful, it must be performed according 
to its own nature, the nature of the object that the action is performed 
upon, and with the tool that is naturally fitted for the purpose, not 
merely according to the wishes of the agent. (387a1-b4) 
4. Speaking is a class of action, and is subject to the success conditions of 
3. (387b11-c4) 
5. Naming (ὀνοµάάζειν), as a part of speaking, is also subject to the success 
conditions of 3. (387c6-d8) 
6. Each type of action requiring a tool for is performance requires a 
specific type of tool (weaving requires shuttles, boring requires trepans 
etc.). (387d10-e3) 
7. The tool required for naming is a name. (388a6-7) 
8. Naming is defined as dividing things as they are and teaching 
something to one another. (388b10-11) 
9. Therefore, the function of a name is to divide up reality and teach 
something to another. (388b10-c1)  16
 I take the “function” of a to be defined by the response to the question “what do we do when we φ with a?”16
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Although ὀνοµάάζειν may appear to be ambivalent between name establishment 
and name use, the parallel with weaving and boring (which use tools), suggest that 
name use is intended here.   There are, we are told, objective conditions which 17
govern what counts as a case of successful name use: whether I use the vocabulary 
available to me successfully is not simply a matter of my own whim, I must use it in 
such a way as to separate things as they are and teach something to another.  18
Likewise, my successfully driving a screw is not merely a matter of my merely 
deciding that I have done so: if, Socrates proposes at 387c, we use the tool that is not 
naturally suited for our intended task we will “go wrong and accomplish nothing”.  19
Although Socrates has elicited agreement that there are necessary connections 
between tool, action and object to be acted upon, no reason has yet been given as to 
why, in the case of names, these necessary connections cannot be constituted by 
something like convention or agreement.  A typical conception of names and naming 20
today would accommodate the idea that the fact that names are conventional is not in 
itself dependent on us, rather it is only the individual naming conventions themselves 
that are dependent on us. The fact that conventions determine name use could itself 
constitute part of a name’s nature. Nothing that Socrates has said so far, therefore, 
 On ὀνοµάάζειν as name-use in the Cratylus more generally see Schofield (1972) 246-248, Ketchum (1978) 145n.17
3, but cf. Barney (2001) 6n.8.
 “Teaching something to another” could, as yet, range from merely communicating something to another when 18
used (and so provide another with new information) to the name itself teaching something to another by yielding 
arcane information when subjected to analysis (cf. Ademollo (2011) 101-2). “Dividing reality as it is”, in the 
etymological section of the discussion, becomes a matter of separating out a natural portion of reality by encoding 
a description of that portion of reality in a name, thus marking what its object is off from what it is not. Finally, in 
the mimetic stage of the theory, separating out a natural portion of reality by encoding a description in a name is 
redefined as combining elemental sounds (letters) that imitate the essential components of that portion of reality. 
The investigator can therefore learn something from the name in the stronger sense of “teaching something to 
another”; however, to understand the definition in the strong sense at this point would surely be to beg the question 
against Hermogenes.
 Cf. Keller (2000) 291-2. 19
 See Anagnostopoulos (1972) 710ff. and Ketchum (1979) 136 for further discussion of this point. 20
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rules out the possibility that successful use of a name may still be use in accordance 
with linguistic conventions, particularly those conventions made at establishment 
(dubbing) events.  21
At 388d6-e3, we are told that names available for our use derive from νόµοι 
set down by the νοµοθέτης. 
Soc: Whose work does the teacher use when he uses a name? 
Her: I don’t know. 
Soc: Don’t you know this either: who provides us with the names we use? 
Her:  Indeed I don’t. 
Soc:  Don’t you think that νόόµος is the provider of these things? 
Her: That’s likely. 
Soc: So whenever a teacher uses a name, he uses the name of the νοµοθέέτης. 
388d6-e3 
The claim that a name-maker is the originator of names implies the rejection 
of the antithesis between νόµος and φύσις. To use a name well - which, we can infer 
from 387d4, means to use it in the naturally correct way - is to use a νόµος in line with 
the purpose for which the name-maker created it.  Thus we see that the φύσις of a 22
name is not independent of νόµος, but is at least in part constituted by it. 
The claims so far then, imply no more than that a tool is used successfully if it 
used in accordance with what it was made for. Since we have not yet been told how a 
name should be made, Hermogenes can thus far accept that names should be used in 
 As Barney (1997) notes, Hermogenes does indeed make a distinction between name use and name establishment 21
in his own conventionalist thesis.
 See Ademollo (2011) 105 for a discussion of καλῶς at 388c5-7 and 391b1 as equivalent to ὀρθῶς. Later 22
(431c-433c), a clear distinction between “finely” and “correctly” is made with the possibility that names may vary 
in quality and yet still be names.
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line with νόµοι that have been set down; the question of whether the names set down 
by the name-maker are themselves arbitrary is yet to be addressed. 
2. Constraints on Name-Making and the Species-Form 
When the discussion moves from using names to making names it becomes 
apparent that the successful establishment of νόµοι is itself subject to external, natural 
constraints. Socratic “naming-conventions” – at least as far as this dialogue is 
concerned – are not “up to us”, but rather, like tools, they must be manufactured in the 
correct way to succeed as naming conventions at all. The expert name-maker knows 
how to create a name just as the expert shuttle-maker knows how to create a shuttle. 
The question is, then, in what does this knowledge consist? Once this is established, 
the natural constraints on name making will become clearer.  
Socrates first convinces Hermogenes that a tool must be made by the relevant 
craftsman. This craftsman is the only person who can make that tool because only he 
has the requisite expertise (τέχνη). The making of shuttles is the province of the 
carpenter; analogously the making of names is the province of the νοµοθέτης, the 
name-maker.  
Soc: Does everyone seem to you to be a νοµοθέέτης, or only the one who has 
the skill (τέέχνη)? 
Her: Only the one who has the skill. 
Soc: So the setting of names is not the province of everyone, Hermogenes, 
but of a particular name-maker (ὀνοµατουργόός). And this man, so it seems, 
is the νοµοθέέτης, who is the rarest of craftsmen in the human race. 
Her: So it seems. 
388e4-389a4 
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Socrates next claims that each class of tool (names, trepans, shuttles etc.) has a 
Form, described as “that sort of thing which has the nature of φ-ing (τοιοῦτόόν τι ὃ 
ἐπεφύύκει κερκίίζειν)” (389a7-8), “the Form (τὸ εἶδος)” (389b3) and “the x itself” (αὐτο ὃ 
ἒστιν [x]) (389b5). This Form is most likely envisaged as a paradeigma or “pattern” 
which the craftsmen looks to as he fashions his tool (389a5). 
Finally, Socrates posits a further kind of specific φύσις that renders specific 
tools within a class appropriate for a specific product. The shuttle must have the Form 
of a shuttle, but, in addition, it must have the specific nature required to weave a 
particular type of cloth (cotton, for example).  
Soc: Now, when it is necessary to make a shuttle for light garments or thick 
or woollen or linen ones, or some other kind of clothing, all the shuttles 
must have the Form, but whatever nature is best for each type of 
woven product, it is necessary to put this nature into each tool. 
389b8-c1 
A tool’s specific nature is described in the text as: 
1. “The nature of a tool such as is naturally finest for each product”: 
οἵα δ’ ἑκάστῳ καλλίστη ἐπεφύκει...[ἡ φύσις].  (389b10)  23
2. “The tool naturally suited by nature for each product”: τὸ φύσει 
ἑκάστῳ πεφυκὸς ὄργανον. (389c4) 
3. (Later) τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος: “The proper/fitting Form” (390a6).  24
 I take ἑκάστῳ to be anaphoric of the earlier λεπτῷ ἱµατίῳ κτλ., and translate ἑκάστῳ as “each product” rather 23
than “each task”  (as Reeve (1998) does). Contra Ketchum (1979) n.9, there is no reason to think that ἑκάστῳ is 
not still anaphoric of λεπτῷ ἱµατίῳ κτλ. at 389c4, since no new object has been provided. Furthermore, ὑφάσµατος 
at 389d1 indicates the object of the task (the product), not the task itself.
 These distinctions follow Calvert (1968) 29-30.24
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I will refer to this as the Species-Form, because it explains the difference 
between species of a genus of tool, rather than between genera of tools.  
The Species-Form is unique to the Cratylus in the middle period dialogues and 
there has been some debate as to whether to count these Species-Forms among the 
Forms proper.  However, the similarity in language between the description of the 25
Species-Forms and more traditional generic Forms and, moreover, the similarity 
between their qualities and those favoured by Plato in his accounts of traditional 
Forms (they have independent existence and are objects of knowledge (389c6-8)) 
suggest that they are conceived of as types of Forms.  Merely for a name to be 26
modelled on the generic form will not do. Just as a shuttle must have the Species-
Form appropriate to weaving wool in order to be used to weave woollen products, a 
name for a dog, it seems, must likewise have the Species-Form appropriate for 
naming dogs.  27
 Thus the introduction of Species-Forms for individual names appears to 
collapse the distinction between a name’s being a correct name for an object and its 
being a name for that object at all.  A putative name for x will not be a name for x if 28
 Cf., e.g., Ademollo (2011) 117-8, Gold (1978) 233-8, but Anagnostopoulos (1981) 710 for an opposing view. 25
We might see some connection with the mention of genus and species in the later dialogues, e.g., Sph. 258 and 
Phlb. 12-17. However, the mention of species in these places is not clearly connected to an exposition of the 
Forms as understood in the middle period dialogues. 
 According to Calvert (1970) 26-34, Species-Forms are immanent, as opposed to generic Forms which are 26
presented as wholly separate: such a distinction seems to be made and maintained quite rigorously through this 
passage. Yet while the objects are said to “have” these Forms at 389b, “have” expresses a vague relation: it does 
not follow from this that the Species-Forms are immanent or abstract. See Calvert, ibid., for a similar view of the 
vagueness of ἔχειν. 
 Silverman (1992, 36) is thus mistaken in implying that a bad carpenter could make a generic shuttle.27
 Ademollo terms this the “redundancy theory” of correctness (2011) passim, but esp. 24, 98. While Socrates 28
suggests at 387a8-9 (cf. 387c3-4) that if we use the incorrect tool we will “go wrong and accomplish nothing,” this 
does not rule out the possibility that there may be different degrees of correctness (cf. 392a-d); Socrates may 
therefore allow that names embody a Species-Form to a greater or lesser degree of approximation, but, 
nevertheless, we might suppose there is a limit beyond which a name will not be able to function as a name for its 
nominatum. Cf. Sedley (2003) 142-6.
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it does not “have” that correct Species-Form.  It is likely, then, that one cannot press 29
a name created to name one thing into service of naming something else for which it 
was not created.  30
We are further informed that the setting of the Species-Form into the matter is 
the province of the special expertise of name making.  The expert name-maker must 
know how to set this Species-Form in his sound-matter, and only names constructed 
on this basis have legitimacy.  31
Soc: Well then, dear man, must the νοµοθέέτης not also know how to set that 
name suited by nature to each object in sounds and syllables, and 
mustn’t he make and set all the names while looking to that-thing-which-
the-name-itself-is, if he intends to be an authoritative (κύύριος) setter of 
names? 
389d4-d8 
 Many have supposed that in claiming a name-maker must embody a Species-
Form Socrates merely supposes that he must embody a certain specific function: the 
name of a dog, say, must simply have or embody the function of naming a dog.  This 32
 Williams (1982) 83, points out that Cratylus’ theory collapses the distinction between a name’s being correct and 29
a name’s being a name. However, he does not note that this is an implication of the claim that names have Forms. 
It is not then clear that Williams is correct in suggesting that Socrates’ later distinction between correctness and 
reference is not made at the price of his own theory.
 If Socrates were following the model of functions derived from the example of knives in Rep. 352d-353b, he 30
could mark a distinction between correctness and success conditions for making a name: what something would 
best be called versus what something could be called at a pinch (cf. Millikan (1984) 1-11). It is not immediately 
obvious how this characterisation of function (which is silent on the Forms) could be rendered consistent with the 
claim that artefacts have Forms: that would seem to entail that a screwdriver cannot become a wrench – even 
temporarily – any more than a sunflower can start growing apples. For a screwdriver to perform the function of a 
wrench, for example, it would somehow have to participate in the relevant Form – and on the model given in the 
Cratylus it is not immediately clear how this could happen. However, an anonymous referee at CCJ notes that 
given an inherent imperfection in a particular’s instantiating a Form, this may allow it to sufficiently instantiate 
one Species-Form while simultaneously instantiating another “nearby” Form. Thus a butter-knife might also cut 
fish passably well, say. It does not follow that it could thus instantiate the Form of a pruning-knife. For further 
discussion on names as imperfect instantiations of Forms, see § 3. 
 I follow Ademollo (2011, 135-6) in considering the name-maker to be authoritative (κύύριος) in the sense of 31
“legitimate” (or perhaps “genuine”).
 See, e.g., Ackrill (1997), Kahn (1986), Ketchum (1979), Sedley (2003).32
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explanation is unsatisfying. The Forms have been introduced to explain to 
Hermogenes why names are naturally correct; however, identifying Species-Forms 
with functions leaves us with the bland suggestion that, once the craftsman has 
embodied this ideal function in matter, the tool will be capable of performing 
whatever real function the craftsman has constructed it to perform. An informative 
answer to the question “Why does this name name this object?” must be more than 
“because this name has the function of naming this object”.  Species-Forms have to 33
be more than functions if they are to explain those functions.  More pertinently, it is 34
unclear what knowledge of a Species-Form an expert name-maker can have if it is 
characterised purely in terms of function: a wool-shuttle maker cannot make a wool-
shuttle purely in virtue of his knowledge of what a wool-shuttle does. It would be 
wise, then, to consider further what knowledge is involved in the making of tools in 
general, and names in particular. 
3. Name-Making and Name-Using 
We have seen Socrates establish that making tools belongs to the province of 
expertises or τέχναι. To be an expert – to have a τέχνη – is to possess a particular body 
of knowledge; the expert is in a position to know, and give an account of, the objects 
of his expertise, thus communicating his knowledge to others, making more craftsmen 
 Ketchum (1979, 143) acknowledges this consequence, but seems happy to accept it nonetheless.33
 Cf. Bestor (1980) 314-5, for a similar point. One might attempt to make the answer more informative by 34
specifying in further detail what the claim that a name’s Form is a function amounts to. Some who attempt to do so 
equate a name’s function with its meaning. Ackrill (1994, 43-4), for example, states that the name is identified 
solely by reference to the job it does and subsequently claims the Form of a name is its meaning (where “meaning” 
is understood as some concept or other). He infers from this that structural considerations are of no account: the 
intrinsic properties of a given name have no role to play in determining what it picks out. On his interpretation, 
however, he has to concede that the tool analogy does nothing to refute Hermogenes. Nor can he provide a 
connection between the tool analogy and the rest of the dialogue, which he admits is largely devoted to identifying 
appropriate sounds.
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like himself.  The claim that name making is a τέχνη implies that there is a special 35
kind of knowledge involved in the construction of names distinct from the knowledge 
involved in using them. Given that names are classed as tools, considerations derived 
from tool making in general might elucidate what such knowledge might be. 
A carpenter knows how to make a shuttle. Socrates and Hermogenes have just 
agreed that a shuttle is for dividing weft and warp at the loom. The carpenter, 
however, must know a lot more than this in order to make a shuttle. Importantly, he 
must know what a shuttle must be like in order to divide weft and warp.  In other 36
words, he must know what properties a shuttle must have in order to weave a 
particular kind of fabric. He must know something about what a shuttle does, of 
course, but his discovery of the Form of the shuttle (389c4) does not involve learning 
how to weave. That is the province of the weaver. 
Thus it should be clear that we cannot straightforwardly identify the Form of F 
with F’s function: the Form of a shuttle, for example, is not weaving, just as the 
Species-Form of a wool-shuttle is not weaving wool. If Socrates’ account of tool 
making is intended to identify success conditions for tool-production, the equation of 
Form, or Species-Form, with function alone cannot make sense of it. Rather, when 
Plato speaks of the Form of a tool that the craftsman looks to, it is likely that he 
means us to understand it as the object of the craftsman’s knowledge about shuttles, 
which includes, inter alia, the characteristics that a tool must have in order to perform 
its function: its shape, composition, and, perhaps even to some extent, material 
 Prot. 321a ff.; Meno 87b ff..35
 This is surely suggested by the description of the Form of shuttle as τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν: “the kind of 36
thing that naturally weaves”, at 389a.
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properties.  I will term such properties structural properties. It has already been 37
agreed that names are tools; a fortiori the Forms of names can also be so 
characterised.  
As the passage proceeds, we see that the refining of a tool is not a one-man 
operation, according to Socrates: the tool-maker lacks some of the required 
knowledge, which only the professional user has. In the case of names, the expert user 
is the dialectician.  38
Soc: Now who then will know whether the proper Form of the shuttle has 
been set in the wood – whatever kind of wood it is? The one who made 
it, the carpenter, or the one who will use it, the weaver? 
Her: It’s reasonable to say that it’s rather the one who is going to use it, 
Socrates. 
Soc: Who is it that will use the work of the lyre-maker? Is not this man the 
one who knows best how to oversee the making of the lyre and who 
would know whether it has been well made or not? 
Her: Certainly. 
Soc: And who’s that? 
Her: The lyre-player. 
Soc: And who will be best placed to know about the products of the ship-
builder? 
Her: The captain. 
Soc: And who would be best placed to oversee the work of the νοµοθέέτης and 
judge his work – both here and abroad? Is it not the one who will use it? 
 Cf. Patterson, (1985), 131-2: “[T]he fact that the intelligible realm determined by the Forms includes a 37
functionally defined Form of Pruning Knife entails that to be a worldly pruning knife is to be something suited to 
serve a specific function having a place in the natural order. A sensible object can be this only if (a) there is a 
natural type of work or function to be performed, and (b) the object’s (corporeal) parts are so constituted and 
distributed that it is suited to perform that work. When these two conditions are met, the piece of metal participates 
in the separate, intelligible Form of Pruning Knife “fixed in the nature of things.””
 Given we have already been told that the user of names is a teacher at 388c6, it would seem safe to identify him 38
with the dialectician here.
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Her: Yes. 
Soc: And this is the man who knows how to ask questions? 
Her: Of course. 
Soc: And also how to answer them? 
Her: Yes. 
Soc: And would you call the man who knows about asking and answering 
questions anything other than a dialectician? 
Her: No, this is what I’d call him. 
Soc: So then: the job of the carpenter is to make the rudder under the 
supervision of the captain, if he intends the rudder to be a fine one. 
Her: It appears so. 
Soc: And the job of the νοµοθέέτης is to make a name under the supervision of 
the dialectician, if he intends to set down a name well. 
390b1-390d7 
The expert user, then, oversees the maker during the production of a tool and 
judges the finished product. The wording here is very careful: Socrates does not say 
that the user knows the Species-Form but that he knows whether that Form has been 
set in the matter. The maker was earlier described as having discovered the Species-
Form, and knowing how to set that Form in matter. The knowledge of each is 
characterised differently.  Although the user is depicted as overseeing the maker, 39
clearly they both know something, since they are both characterised as practitioners of 
 This parallels Euthyd. 289a-d, where the makers and users of artefacts are said to have distinct knowledge 39
related to the same object: “the art which makes is one thing and that which uses is another; they are quite distinct 
although they deal with the same thing”. 
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crafts.   And since they both know something, they must stand in some relation to a 40
corresponding Species-Form.  41
Since the tool-maker’s knowledge primarily concerns the structural properties 
of a tool, I will speak of him as knowing the Species-Form in its structural aspect. 
Since the user’s expertise primarily concerns a tool’s use, it would be most natural to 
suppose he knows the Species-Form in its functional aspect. However, in the tool 
analogy, the expert user’s role is not exhausted by merely using the maker’s products. 
Socrates tells us that he must collaborate with the toolmaker in producing the tool, 
and judge whether the tool is well made once it has been produced: he must be 
qualified know whether the form has been set in the matter. Thus even the expert 
user’s knowledge cannot be reduced to knowledge of function alone. For a weaver to 
tell a shuttle-maker maker that such-and-such a shuttle fails to discharge a particular 
function does nothing to help the maker improve on his efforts. In order to supervise 
the construction of a tool, the user must, then, also have knowledge of a tool’s 
structure, at least in so far as it conduces to a particular function, to explain to the 
maker what alterations must be made to improve a tool’s performance.  42
It would be difficult to see why Socrates makes a distinction between maker 
and user if knowledge of the Species-Forms of names amounts only to knowledge of 
 There are similarities with Rep. 601c-602a, although there the maker is ascribed only true belief. However, the 40
purpose of that passage is primarily to demonstrate the inferiority of the imitator (who does not even have belief): 
thus, as Ademollo (2011, 142n.116) suggests, it is unwise to attempt to import the claims made there into this 
passage.
 Cf. Aristotle Phys 2, 194a36ff.: “There are two skills that govern matter and have knowledge: the skill of using 41
and the skill that directs the making. So the using skill is also, in a way, directive, but it differs from the other in 
that it has knowledge of the form, whereas the skill that directs the making has knowledge of the matter. So the 
helmsman knows the form of the rudder and directs, and the other, the maker, knows from what kind of matter and 
by what changes the rudder will come to be.” Accepting that Aristotle is using different categories to Plato (and so 
the comparison will not be complete in this way) we can nevertheless see him acknowledging that two forms of 
knowledge are associated with artefacts – corresponding to production and use. Charlton (1970, n. ad loc.) 
suggests that Aristotle is referencing the Cratylus here.
 Pace Silverman (1992) 38.  42
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their functions. Nothing here would qualify the maker over the expert user in the 
making of tools. Nor would the user’s judgement aid in the collaborative process if he 
could not direct the maker to improve the structure of his tools. Since a name is a tool, 
the expert user’s knowledge a Species-Form of a name must also involve knowledge 
of the structural features that they lend to their particulars. 
In considering further what kind of structural features might support a name’s 
function let us return to 388b-c, where we are told that when we use names we “teach 
something to one another and divide things as they are” and, thus, that a name is a 
tool for instructing and dividing ousiai. We might plausibly infer from this, as Sedley 
does, that if the function of names in general is to separate ousiai, the function of a 
particular name must be to separate out the particular ousia of an object that a user 
intends to pick out, where ousia need not be understood in any strict sense as essence 
(although this might be the ideal), but in a “weaker and more inclusive sense”.  Thus 43
a name will separate out its nominatum/nominata from the rest of reality by 
identifying some unique feature of it. 
The competence of the dialectician to judge whether names are well made also 
depends largely on his knowledge of the nominata (or their ousiai) that they will be 
used for. Yet if this knowledge is to have any substantive role in his judgement of 
whether a particular name can perform its intended function, then it would seem that 
there must be some corresponding feature of that name which can be judged in the 
light of the nature of the nominatum. 
Socrates suggests precisely such a feature in the pages following the tool 
analogy, where he claims that a name, decoded in the correct way, should yield 
 Sedley (2003) 84.43
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informational content that captures the ousia of its nominatum. The etymological 
discussion shows this informational content to be a form of identifying description, 
which the name-maker compresses and encodes into a name. So, for example, the 
identifying description for “wisdom” (411d4-5), φορᾶς...καὶ ῥοῦ νόόησις (“intellection 
of motion and flow”), is compressed and encoded to yield the name φρόόνησις; “moon” 
(σελήήνη) appears to be an Atticised version of σελαναίία, in turn compressed from 
σελαενονεοάάεια, which is itself an encoding of the description,  σέέλας νέέον τε καὶ ἕνον 
ἔχει ἀείί (“that which always has old and new gleam”) (409b-c).  The skill of the 44
name-maker does not stop here, it would seem; if a name can be analysed into a 
description, and the names in that description can be analysed into further 
descriptions, we risk an infinite regress. Socrates therefore proposes the existence of 
certain primary or atomic names into which these compound names are ultimately 
resolved (421d-422b). These primary names imitate their objects at the atomic level. 
In effect, when somebody makes a name they work in much the same way as 
someone who tries to represent reality through painting, blending together pigments 
to imitate his object (424dff.). Thus we are told, for example, that rho indicates 
motion, tau, rest and binding, and omicron, roundness. The knowledge of the name-
maker, then, also includes knowledge of the classification the imitative properties of 
these primary name-sounds, and the primary classes of being they track 
(424c6-425a2).   The dialectician, in his particular capacity of overseeing the name-45
maker and judging his products, on the other hand, need not know how to encode 
 I thank an anonymous referee at CCJ for pointing me in the direction of this perspicuous example.44
 Cf. 426a-b: “It’s clear that anyone claiming to be expert (τεχνικὸν) in these matters must especially be able to 45
give clear explanations of the primary names, or he can be sure that he will be talking nonsense about the 
compound ones.”
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names, rather he must know how to decode them.  Once he has done this, he may see 46
whether the informational content contained in a name identifies his desired ousia: 
whether the Species-Form has been embodied in the matter.  
There is good reason, then, not to dismiss, along with Ademollo, Socrates’ 
carefully made distinction between name-maker and dialectician as unreal. While 
voicing his suspicion that “the notion of the specific forms of name may be, as a 
matter of fact, much more tightly connected with the purpose of naturalism than is 
usually supposed”, he nevertheless considers the distinction between name-maker and 
name user to be of merely dramatic significance: it sets up Socrates as the dialectician 
who is competent to judge the efforts of the name-maker (and thus decide whether his 
names have been well made or not (cf. 390b6)) in the etymological investigation that 
is about to come.  47
 Ademollo believes that Socrates does not seriously intend the distinction 
between name-maker and dialectician because the name-maker must have “some 
sort” of knowledge of the nature of the thing named in order to appropriately embody 
a name for that thing in the sound-matter, – “which we should expect to be the 
dialectician’s hallmark”.  This, however, seems to be a weak ground for discounting 48
the distinction in the particular case of names. It ignores my warning to take the claim 
 Sedley (2003, 41) impresses upon us the distinction between the skill of encoding and the skill of decoding: “our 46
job as etymologists is not to repeat the work of the name-makers, but to reverse it, decomposing what they 
composed and thereby decoding what they encoded”. I assign this decoding skill to the dialectician, in his 
supervisory role. 
 Ademollo (2011)138, 144.47
 Ademollo (2011, 143) also considers the fact that the dialectician is not mentioned again after 391d is speaks 48
against a serious distinction between the two crafts. This is odd, since he holds - plausibly - that the role of the 
dialectician is precisely the one adopted by Socrates for the remainder of the dialogue. One might, at any rate, 
suspect it contrary to Socrates’ characteristic modesty to impress upon us that he is an expert in using names, yet I 
suspect that the dialectician is indeed mentioned again as “one who knows about names” at 394b3-4 (see §3). 
Moreover, at 425a-b, it seems that Socrates, in his role as dialectician (judging whether primary and compound 
names have been set down correctly), clearly distinguishes his activities from those of the original name-makers.
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that names are tools seriously; any tool-maker would struggle to make his tool if he 
had no knowledge of the use to which it would be put: the same is a fortiori true of 
names.  Moreover, Socrates has made explicit the distinct role of the dialectician in 49
superintending the work of the name-maker while the name is being produced.  We 50
should see both crafts working in tandem: the dialectician identifies the object to be 
named and provides the name-maker with the information that needs to be embodied 
in a name for it.   51
Ademollo further suggests that from the perspective of the dialogue the name-
makers have “got things wrong” precisely because they were not supervised by the 
dialecticians: this relies on his interpretation of the long etymological section that sees 
name-makers as erring across the board in their name making.  If true, however, this 52
strengthens the case for the dialectician to supervise the name-maker if the names to 
be well made. Yet it is not indeed clear that name-makers erred across the board. 
Sedley informs us that those words relating to cosmological themes are, in fact, 
judged to be correct by Socrates: only the ethical etymologies are misguided.  One 53
might therefore respond to Ademollo, modulo Sedley, that, perhaps, a name-maker’s 
 Ademollo has no trouble with the reality of the distinction in these other cases. 49
 The dialectician may therefore be said to impart true beliefs to the νοµοθέτης, but not knowledge (cf. Men. 97a-50
c).
  I thank the anonymous referee at CCJ for his suggestions relating to this point. It is also important not to 51
confuse a distinction between the distinct crafts of using and making with the requirement that there be distinct 
practitioners of those crafts. Thus it is possible that the original name-makers were, indeed, also dialecticians, but 
it does not follow that the practitioners of the two crafts are co-extensive: not all dialecticians need have the 
knowledge appropriate to the name-maker.
 Ademollo (2011) 143, cf. 207.52
 Sedley (2003) e.g. 98, 108-9.53
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knowledge of the things to be named is indeed sufficient to construct some, but not 
all, names passably well.   54
Moreover, maintaining a clear distinction between name-maker and 
dialectician offsets another of Ademollo’s worries: namely, that one can acquire the 
information that a name must supply about its nominatum to perform its function from 
the Form of that nominatum alone, therefore one would not seem to need a separate 
Form of its name.  However, the distinction between the expertises of name-maker 55
and name-user shows us precisely why Species-Forms of names are required. The 
dialectician does not have the knowledge to make names; he does not know how to 
embody the relevant information into a name by blending sounds together to 
represent, by imitation or description, the complex ousiai that he wishes to separate 
out. There is something distinctive about the name-maker’s abilities: this is his unique 
capacity to embody structures in sounds, thus creating a tool that can separate out an 
ousia. This knowledge comes from his acquaintance with the Species-Forms of 
names, not the Forms of objects for which those names are intended.  56
The informational content of names can be encoded in such a way that it is 
only apparent to the expert. At 394a5-b7 Socrates sets up an analogy between “the 
one who knows about names” (here, the dialectician) and the doctor.   Names that are 57
“really the same” (τὰ ἀυτὰ ὄντα), might, in their superficial phenomenal differences, 
 It might be helpful here to recall the Phaedrus’ (263a-266d) distinction between disputed words, and words 54
whose meanings all agree on; dialectic is only pressed into service of disambiguating the latter.
 Ademollo (2011) 138.55
 Sedley (2003, 82) notes that the Species-Form of a name is clearly distinct from the Form of its nominatum “and 56
rightly so, since anyone trying to embody the Form of table in matter, even if that matter were vocal sound, would 
be making a table (albeit in this case unsuccessfully), not making a name.”
 Since the doctor is primarily an expert in using drugs, and he is presented as examining drugs, not making them, 57
I take the “one who knows about names” in the analogous case of naming to be the one who uses names, viz. the 
dialectician.
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mislead the layman into thinking that they are different. However, drugs that are 
“really the same” (τὰ ἀυτὰ ὄντα), but appear different to the layman because of 
additions or variations in colour or smell, do not deceive the doctor who examines 
(σκοπουµέένος) their dunamis, but appear the same to him. Likewise, the “one who 
knows about names”, the dialectician, can examine a name’s dunamis and is not 
confused if some letter is added or changed or removed, or even if “the dunamis of 
the name is in completely different letters” (394b3-6). 
It has to my mind been comprehensively shown by now that in no way does 
this passage seem “to make the name into a ghost that may take any form”, as 
Robinson suggests.  Simply because the informational content may be embodied in 58
different ways, this does not suggest that any concatenation of sounds will do: the 
name must nevertheless be susceptible of being decoded into the right informational 
content. We may suppose, then, that the informational content a name must provide 
will indeed also constrain the phonemes in which it can be embodied.  59
It is not, however, immediately obvious what Socrates means by claiming that 
a name has a dunamis, which, typically in Plato and elsewhere, has connotations of 
“power” or “capacity”.  Socrates’ claim, by way of illustration, that the names 60
 Robinson (1969) 116.58
 The notion that the Species-Forms constrain the phonetic structures to the degree suggested here is also 59
consistent with other passages in the Cratylus where Socrates appears to suggest that there is more than one 
phonetic structure capable of instantiating a name. At 389d4-390a, Socrates states that words of the same semantic 
type can have different phenomenal characteristics in different languages just as the smiths in these different 
countries may render the same Form “in different iron (ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήήρῳ)” (390a1). Hence, we might infer, it is 
possible that, say, “cheval”, “horse”, “equus” and ἵππος are all correct names for a horse. I follow Sedley (2003, 
130-1) in supposing different languages use different matter because they have different systems of basic sounds. 
It does not follow, then, that one can use any old matter. The key is to tighten up the definition of “arbitrary” in 
play here. Socrates’ radical naturalism allows for the possibility that the name of Hector could have been 
otherwise: it could have been “Astyanax”, for example. But to say that a name is arbitrary is not to say that a name 
could have had some other particular linguistic properties, but rather that it could have had any other particular 
linguistic properties whatsoever (e.g. “Aphrodite”).
 Barney (2001, 88n.6) provides a good overview of the uses of dunamis. I do not view the interpretation of 60
dunamis that will be suggested here as entirely divorced from the more typical use; after all, the relevant structural 
properties of a name are just those properties required for it to be capable of performing a particular function.
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“Hector” (“Holder”) and “Astyanax” (“Town-lord”) (394b7-c1) are two such names, 
does not initially appear to help in deciding the matter conclusively. Sedley, 
considering these proper names to be “chosen to pick out types, not individuals”, 
suggests that both names pick out the same type (let us suppose here, a kingly nature), 
yet Socrates cannot consider them to be strict synonyms, since they yield partially 
different information concerning that type. Thus, he infers, the two names “share the 
same power...by being extensionally equivalent”.  Sedley also claims that when 61
particular names share a dunamis “we must assume that they embody one and the 
same species form of name”, which he has identified purely with their function. 
Informational content is thereby relegated to the means by which a name discharges 
its function, and any number of different means (although not every means), we might 
suppose, would serve this end equally well.   62
If Socrates did consider  “Hector” and “Astyanax” to yield different 
informational contents, but have the same Species-Form, my identification of 
informational content with what I have called the structural aspect of the Species-
Form looks implausible, since then the Species-Form would appear to contain all 
possible sets of informational contents that might be used to pick out an object.   63
However, it is not clear that Socrates does indeed view the two names as 
expressing different informational contents. In these same lines Socrates tells us that 
“Astyanax” and “Hector” signify the same thing (ταὐτὸν σηµαίίνει), despite the fact 
 Sedley (2003) 84. Ademollo (2011, 175) glosses Sedley as follows: “perhaps we might rather take the power to 61
be something like the reference of a term as distinct from its referent.”
 Cf. Sedley (2003) 85. Sedley carefully points out that the means cannot be dispensed with on his account.62
 Ademollo (2011, 134n.98) agrees that names instantiating the same Species-Form of name must supply the same 63
information about their object, since otherwise, “the form would have to be – rather unpalatably – a repository of 
all conceivable information about X.”
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that they share none of the same letters except for tau. Since the examples of “Hector” 
and “Astyanax” are offered up to clarify the claim that phenomenally different names 
share a dunamis, we may suppose, then, that two names share a dunamis in virtue of 
signifying the same thing.  Thus we must consider further what is Socrates means by 
“signifying the same thing”, and what, precisely, we are to understand as being 
signified.  Sedley understands a name to signify an object by designating it in a 64
complex way: “by embodying in a sound the ideal function of the name of x, a 
function which is summed up as that of ‘separating the being’ of x’”, noting that “this 
function may be discharged in a number of ways”.  However, Ademollo, in a careful 65
analysis of the appearances of σηµαίνω in this dialogue, observes that it governs, 
either implicitly or explicitly, a “that clause”, from which he infers that what is 
signified is not, in fact, some object (or type), but the informational content (or 
etymological sense) that a name conveys. Thus (to use Ademollo’s example), 
anthropos “signifies that [σηµαίίνει....ὅτι] the other animals do not investigate 
anything of what they see....whereas the human being [no sooner has he seen it – that 
is ὄπωπε– then he investigates (ἀναθρεῖ) and reflects upon what he has seen]” (399c).  66
If this is correct, then, pace Sedley, when Socrates tells us that “Hector” and 
“Astyanax” signify the same, he does not mean that two names signify the same thing 
 I focus on σηµαίνω here; however, as Ademollo, I treat it as equivalent to δηλόόω in the contexts of use that 64
interest us here. Although δηλόόω appears to have wider application than σηµαίνω in this dialogue (cf. 433d-e), the 
two terms are used interchangeably in the etymological discussion (e.g., the use of δηλόόω in the etymology of 
“ἥρως” (398c)). I will therefore use the English “signify” to translate both terms. See Ademollo (2011, 165-7) for a 
fuller discussion of δηλόόω, and the synonymy of δηλόόω and σηµαίνω at 394c.
 Sedley (2003) 85.65
 For similar appearances of σηµαίνω see, e.g.: 395a-b, 413e, 415c-d, 419e, 437a-b. For Ademollo’s full analysis 66
see, ibid., (155-176), and especially Ademollo’s (174) discussion of οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ἢ βασιλέέα σηµαίίνει (394c3-4) as 
“signifying an individual object as a king – i.e. it signifies that its referent is a king”, since the lack of article here 
suggests that it does not refer to a universal object or kind (pace Sedley). It might be tempting on my interpretation 
to translate σηµαίνω here as “connote” or “give up the informational content of”. Cf. Ketchum (1979, 142)
!  28
by means of different informational content, but that they signify the same 
informational content.  If so, then Socrates supposes the names to be more strictly 67
synonymous than Sedley would have us suppose. Moreover, since two names’ 
“signifying the same” is offered as an explanation for their sharing a dunamis, then 
sharing a dunamis does not look to be merely tantamount to extensional equivalence 
either. As Ademollo notes, Socrates never claims that “Hector” and “Astyanax” 
contain different informational content, only that they contain different letters.  68
Moreover, as we have seen, Socrates not only says that names that share the same 
dunamis, but, explicitly, that they are the same name (394a7): this would seem 
difficult to make sense of this on an interpretation that sees them as merely co-
extensive, and in fact conveying different informational contents. 
The analysis of σηµαίνω is strong evidence in favour of Ademollo’s 
interpretation of dunamis as informational content. Moreover, we can make sense of 
the idea that the names “Hector” and “Astyanax” share informational content by 
appeal to the earlier claim that names instantiate Species-Forms.  While Sedley 
observes that these two names “achieve their designating function” by providing 
partially different information in the process of identifying the nominatum, it is clear 
that the feature of the nominatum that Socrates claims they identify is the same in 
each case (a kingly nature); this far, at least, they appear to be providing the same 
information. Compare this with the case of “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”, whose 
associated descriptions (e.g. “star that is seen in the evening”, “star that is seen in the 
 Cf. Socrates’ earlier claim that the words “hectôr” and “anax” signify virtually the same (σχεδόόν τι ταὐτὸν 67
σηµαίίνει): given Sedley considers proper names as identifying types – does he suppose that “hectôr” and “anax” 
have “almost the same” extension? Yet they would both identify exactly the same class on his reading.
 Ademollo (2011) 173; for further criticisms of Sedley’s reading see, ibid., 175.68
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morning”) clearly pick out different features or aspects of one and the same object.  69
We might learn something new by being told that Hesperus is Phosphorus. It is not 
clear that, given “Hector” and “Astyanax” both signify a kingly nature, that Socrates 
would consider them to differ relevantly in cognitive significance: in so far as the both 
mean (etymologically speaking) a kingly nature, nothing new can be learned by their 
identification.  70
This being so, more general considerations concerning the relationship 
between Forms and particulars might explain such minor differences between their 
informational contents. Socrates had earlier stated that (393a8-9) that the words 
“hectôr” and “anax” signify “virtually the same (σχεδόόν τι ταὐτὸν σηµαίίνει), in that 
both names are kingly,” for, he supposes if one is a lord (anax) of something, one is 
also a possessor (hectôr) of it. Ademollo glosses this as a sufficiency condition: being 
a “town-lord” entails being a “holder” but not vice versa. Since “anax” (thus even 
more so “Astyanax”) seems to contain more specific informational content than 
“Hector”, it is possible, then, that the names qualifying as the same names on 
Socrates’ account do not yield informational content concerning different features of 
the type in question, but informational content that more or less finely circumscribes 
the same features.  This looks to cohere nicely with the idea that the names are 71
instantiations of a Species-Form, and, as such, approximate that Form to varying 
 Compare also with Socrates’ claim at 392c-e that the women of Troy call Hector’s son “Scamandrius” while the 69
men call him “Astyanax”. Although the latter is said to be more correct than the former, both are acknowledged to 
be names for him (cf. Fine (1978) 297). It would seem that these names are co-extensive then, yet nowhere does 
Socrates appear to suggest that these two names have the same dunamis.
 Of course the layman might learn something new, but that would be precisely because he is confused into 70
thinking that they are different names because he cannot see through the sounds and syllables to their underlying 
informational content. 
 Ademollo (2011, 159). As for Socrates’ other sets of “near-synonyms”: the more specific informational content 71
in Iatrocles (“Doctor-Fame”) likewise seems to entail that encoded in Akesimbrotos (“Mortal-Healer”) (but not 
vice versa) (cf. 394c6); if one is a “War-Leader” (Polemarchos) one would thereby be a “Leader” (Agis), and the 
expectation would certainly be that one was “Good-at-War” (Eupolemos).
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degrees. We would not expect two wool-shuttles to be identical to each other, just as 
they would not be identical to the Form.  Socrates’ apparently weaker claim that 72
“Hector” and “Astyanax” are “close to each other” (παραπλήήσιον) and “signify roughly 
the same” (σχεδόόν τι ταὐτὸν σηµαίίνει) can also be made sense of in this light: if 
particular names are shown to have minor differences in informational content, which 
results in their describing their putative objects in a more or less fine-grained manner, 
this is merely a consequence of their condition as particulars.  Nevertheless, two 73
names would be the same in so far as they had the relevant features in common (such 
as containing information pertaining to a kingly nature), and thus share the same 
Species-Form.   74
Ademollo himself concedes that Socrates’ claims about the sameness of names 
would be “all the more pregnant” if we could read it in the light of Socrates’ 
discussion of Forms in the tool analogy.  It is perhaps odd, then, that Ademollo views 75
Species-Forms to have been replaced by a new theory by this point, reasoning that 
Socrates does not mention them again after the tool analogy. However, this 
argumentum ex silentio does not provide strong grounds: neither do we get any 
indication from Socrates that he has dropped them from consideration. Furthermore, 
we must not ignore the clue of Socrates’ choice of dunamis, which in Plato’s works is 
closely related to phusis (one of the terms we saw used to characterise Species-
Forms), and also the strong parallel between Socrates’ claim in the tool analogy 
 E.g. Phd. 74d, Rep. 597a-b.72
 Cf. 432aff..73
 Cf. Ademollo (2011) 171: “It is a genuine Platonic view that things sharing a common feature or form are the 74
same in respect of that feature or Form. Thus as Men. 72ac Socrates claims that bees, which are many and different 
from each other, ‘do not differ at all but are all the same’ in so far as they are bees.”
 Ademollo (2001) 172; cf. Kretzmann (1972) 131.75
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(389d-390a) the name-maker may set the Species-Form in different sounds and 
syllables, and his subsequent claim here (393d-e) that the name-maker may set the 
same dunamis in different letters.  At any rate, the fact that Form-talk drops out of 76
the discussion at this stage should not cause us concern. By telling Hermogenes at the 
start of the etymologies that the next task is to examine the correctness of names 
“with those who know” (391b9), Socrates signals a shift from an account of naming 
and name-making in the abstract to an account from the perspective of the craftsmen 
themselves: one would not expect any craftsman to describe how he practices his craft 
in the abstract language of the Forms. 
One surprising consequence of reading σηµαίνω in line with Ademollo is that 
Socrates does not appear to use any term to express designation in the passage under 
discussion. I suspect it might help us here to recall a name’s classification as a tool. 
Tools are used by someone for a particular task. We might reason accordingly that 
names do not designate their nominata per se, just as a wool-shuttle does not weave a 
woollen garment by itself.  Rather it is the name user who uses a name to designate 77
an individual. This in turn resolves a worry about how a proper name that only yields 
quite general information can “designate” an individual.  It does not. The user 78
designates an individual: the informational content a name gives up only lends it the 
capacity to be so used.  Thus, by investigating the dunamis of a name, we might 79
 On the relation between phusis and dunamis see Barney (2001) 88n.6, and cf. e.g. Soph. 247dff. In the parallel 76
between setting a Form and setting a dunamis, note the similarity of the language of “setting” in both cases: 
εἰς...τίίθησιν  (389d9); ἐντιθῶµεν (393e3).
 Cf. Silverman (1992) 28.77
 Sedley (2003) may seem to fare no better here, since he suggests that the personal names Socrates offers as 78
examples are chosen to pick out types. In virtue of what, then, does “Hector” designate the son of Priam, rather 
than some other qualifying individual? Cf. Ademollo (2011) 173, and 166 on a different, but related point.
 The etymology given of the name Pelops might speak to this: we are told it “signifies (σηµαίίνει) that the one who 79
sees what is near is worthy (ἄξιον) of this appellation” (395c3-4). The etymological analysis of this name appears 
to inform us who it is appropriate to use the name to designate.
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suppose the user indeed discovers a capacity: what it can be used to designate, rather 
than what it designates per se.   80
4. Conclusion 
The tool analogy, on this interpretation, advances a radical linguistic 
naturalism which follows from the conjunction of certain key claims, namely: (1) 
objects in the world, including actions, have an objective and stable existence and are 
mind-independent (these claims merely exclude extreme subjectivism about naming); 
(2) names are a class of tools; (3) tools (at least) have both generic and Species- 
Forms, and it is in virtue of participating in these Forms that they can successfully 
perform their intended functions and be the tools that they are; (4) the making of 
names requires a specific expertise distinct from that of using names. I have argued 
that the distinctive expertise of the name-maker primarily concerns the structural 
features a name must have in order to perform the function required of it. Since his 
knowledge is said to be of the Species-Form, correspondingly, the Species-Form must 
determine the structural features of a name. 
Understanding the Species-Form of Name in tool analogy as governing 
structural as well as functional features of particular names has the advantage of 
rendering the conclusions of the tool analogy non-trivial, and the tool analogy itself a 
substantive case against Hermogenes’ claim that names are arbitrary concatenations of 
sounds, “pieces of voice” whose namehood is conferred on them by agreement or fiat 
alone. Only a reading such as this respects the distinction between the collaboration 
 Strawson might be sympathetic to such a view: he denies expressions have meanings per se, but considers the 80
significance of expressions to be “general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons” 
which “cannot be identified with the object it is used, on a particular occasion, to refer to" (1959, 327), and, 
“’Mentioning’ or ‘referring’” is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an 
expression to do” (326).
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between the expertise name-maker and tool-user, and the superior epistemic position 
of the name-maker in constructing and establishing names. It is, after all, the unique 
qualification of the name-maker to make names that Socrates points to when 
summing up his refutation of Hermogenes. 
Soc: It is likely then, Hermogenes, that the setting of names is not a trivial 
business, as you think; nor is it the province of insignificant men or 
anyone who pops along. And Cratylus speaks (ἀληθῆ λέέγει) when he says 
that names are by nature for things, and that not everyone is a craftsman 
of names, but only he who looks to the name which is natural for each 
thing and is able to set its form in letters and syllables. 
390d7-e5 
  
The claim that Species-Forms determine structural features also dovetails 
nicely with the view, expressed in etymological thesis, that names yield informational 
content when decoded. Since there is no indication in the text that Socrates has 
changed theoretical tack between the tool analogy and the etymologies it is surely to 
any interpretation’s credit if it does not require him to. 
Although the jury is out on Plato’s final verdict on naming in this dialogue, a 
popular line of interpretation sees the mimetic theory thrown out, and agreement 
reinstated as securing reference toward the end of the dialogue at 434cff..  A case 81
study is made of the word σκληρόότης, which is agreed to reveal hardness to those using 
the word, yet is found not to contain the mimetic properties that should enable it to do 
so. Cratylus is left to respond that he understands what the name picks out through 
ἔθος, which consequently must overrule the natural imitative properties that the name 
has. If this is so, then the etymological-mimetic theory of naming must be rejected: 
 Following others, such as Bestor (1980), Robinson (1969) and Schofield (1982), I take the dialogue to reinstate 81
conventionalism. See, for example, Kahn (1973), Kretzmann (1971) and Sedley (2003) for opposing 
interpretations. 
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the mimetic properties of a name cannot explain its successfully picking out a 
nominatum because they are neither necessary nor sufficient for it doing so.  82
What is less remarked upon, and I hope should be suggested to the reader on 
the interpretation of the tool analogy offered here, is that the rot runs deeper than this: 
if custom, agreement or habit can fix reference, the claim that names have Species-
Forms cannot be saved either. This is because having the Species-Form of name-for-
hardness suggests certain structural constraints on what a name could be like: 
σκληρόότης fails to meet such requirements – perhaps it is the linguistic equivalent of 
trying to use a silk-shuttle to weave wool. Yet σκληρόότης nevertheless succeeds in 
picking out the intended referent. Since we cannot explain how this occurs by appeal 
to the name’s Species-Form, Species-Forms end up failing to explain the very things 
they were introduced to explain in the first place.  83
If the claim that names have Forms entails strict naturalism in naming and that 
naturalism is subsequently rejected, then it follows that the claim that names have 
Forms must be thrown out as well. Since the claim that names have Species-Forms is 
central to the argument of the tool analogy, it is difficult, then, to make sense of 
Ademollo’s claim that the tool analogy is designed to “admit of a reinterpretation in 
favour of conventionalism” once we have been apprised of later developments in the 
 While this passage shows that the appropriate mimetic properties of a name are not necessary for its picking out 82
an object, it is not as immediately obvious that they are not sufficient either; however, on this point see Smith 
(2008) 133-4: “[L]ikeness cannot even be sufficient for reference. Since convention can override any already-
existing putative mimetic link, there must be a further condition for successful reference: either there is a 
convention in place which accords with the natural relation of likeness or a supplementary understanding between 
two interlocutors (a convention) that no convention is in place at all. If one can use names to refer to nominata that 
they are unlike by agreeing upon the reference, then one must also secure agreement to get a name to attach to an 
object that it is like rather than an object it is dissimilar to.”
 Even on a view of Forms as specifying functions alone, unpalatable constraints on names would still result. For 83
example, at 432ff., our ability to successfully use a name, which was created for one object, to pick out another, 
such as successfully using the name “Hermogenes” to pick out Cratylus ought not be possible if names had Forms 
that strictly specified their functions (say the function of picking out Hermogenes).
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dialogue.  To reinterpret the tool analogy in this way, I submit, would involve 84
ignoring, not reinterpreting, the claim that names are tools and, in particular, the idea 
that name making and name using are distinct expertises. Only if Socrates has radical 
naturalism in mind in the tool analogy is this distinction intelligible at all. 
 It may be that Plato instead intentionally leaves the reader with a 
methodological question as to what role the Forms can play in an account of linguistic 
phenomena. The dialogue as a whole would therefore reveal a concern that certain 
phenomena may not be susceptible of an explanation that appeals to the Forms, since 
the resulting account cannot accommodate the certain features of actual linguistic 
practice. This is not tantamount to a rejection of the theory of Forms, or even, 
necessarily, a substantial criticism of it. Nothing follows for the explanation of other 
classes of particulars: it is quite possible that Plato views linguistic expressions, at 
least, as a special case. Perhaps, as Aristotle suggests, we are meant to conclude that it 
is a mistake to class names as tools.  Or, perhaps, taking our cue from Aristotle 85
again, we might suspect that Plato’s concerns here cover a broader class of objects. 
Names, and tools in general, are also artefacts. Yet Aristotle testifies that Plato ended 
up denying that artefacts had Forms; one might then speculate that this dialogue 
exposes an early worry that may ultimately come to concern the possibility of 
artefactual Forms in general.  86
 Ademollo (2011) 424.84
 Aristotle De Int. 4 16b33-17a2.85
 Aristotle Met. A 991b, M 1080a, L 1070a. Oddly enough, Ademollo (2011, 116) maintains that Aristotle is 86
mistaken to suggest that Plato denied artefactual Forms given that his reports conflict with the passage under 
consideration here, yet expresses suspicions (125) that we need to dispose of the idea of the Forms of names, given 
the conclusions of the dialogue. Yet if the Forms in question are to be thrown out, then it follows that our passage 
may not represent Plato’s own considered views on the matter. 
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